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CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACTS EXECUTED
IN FOREIGN STATES-ENFORCEMENT IN COLORADO AGAINST

ATTACHNG CREDITOR WITHOUT NOTICE-Commercial Credit

Company vs. Higbee-No. 12845-Decided March 20, 1933Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Plaintiff in Error intervened in an attachment suit involving
an automobile, the petition of intervention alleging that the defendant
had purchased the automobile in California under a conditional sale
contract reserving title in the vendor, prohibiting the purchaser from
encumbering or permitting attachments to be levied against the property, and prohibiting removal of the car from the state or California
without written consent of the vendor. The demurrer of the original'
plaintiff to the petition of intervention was sustained.
2. The courts of Colorado will not recognize the rights of a
vendor of an automobile or his grantee under a valid conditional sales
contract executed in California as against the rights of an attaching
creditor in Colorado who levies upon the automobile which has been
removed to Colorado without the permission or consent of the vendor
or his grantee.
3. Such a contract, although valid in the state where executed,
cannot be enforced against interested parties without notice in Colorado, because such action would be contrary to public policy and would
result in detriment to the interests of a citizen of Colorado.
4. Secret liens reserved to the vendor of chattels in other states
will not be recognized against interested persons without notice in
Colorado.
5. The secret character of an unrecorded contract for conditional
sale of personalty, reserving title in the vendor, is against public policy
and contrary to the express provisions of the Statute of Frauds and
Perjuries in Colorado.--Judgment afflrmed.
AUTOMOBILES-CERTIFICATE OF TITLE-DUTY OF PURCHASER OF

NEW CAR-The Colorado State Bank vs. Riede-No. 12866Decided March 27,1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Plaintiff brought replevin for automobile. Directed verdict
for defendant. Defendant purchased a new automobile and received
dealer's bill of sale, which he recorded on October 7, 1930. Seller, on
October 1, 1930, representing himself to be the owner, secured a loan
of $1,000 from plaintiff and gave chattel mortgage on automobile,
which was recorded October 2, 1930.
2. Upon the execution and delivery of a dealer's bill of sale for
a new automobile and delivery of car, the transfer is complete and
title passes to the purchaser.
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3. Section 3, Chap. 137, Session Laws of 1927, with reference
to certificate of title does not apply to cases of dealers selling new automobiles.
4. Where purchaser of new car purchases same in good faith and
receives bill of sale, a subsequent mortgagee cannot defeat the title of
the purchaser.--Judgment affirmed.
PERSONAL INJURIES-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-RELATION
PENSATORY DAMAGES-USE OF SPRING GUN -TO

TO COMPROTECT

PROPERTY--Starkey vs. Dameron-No. 13118-Decided March
27, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Plaintiff recovered judgment of $100 compensatory damages
and $2,000 exemplary damages for injuries sustained by discharge of
spring gun attached to gasoline pump outside of filling station, which
was an automatic pump, plaintiff claiming he had deposited his money
in pump and when it did not deliver, he attempted to get his money
out when he was injured by a spring gun which defendant had attached
to prevent theft of gasoline.
2. The installation of a spring gun to protect property against
theft is improper except in a domicil. The installation thereof in or
about buildings not a domicil, renders one liable for injuries sustained
by explosion thereof.
3. Exemplary damages awarded must have some reasonable relation to compensatory damages. Where exemplary damages are awarded
in a sum twenty times the compensatory damages awarded, the award
will not be upheld.
Judgment reversed with directions that if plaintiff will consent
to modification of exemplary to an amount not exceeding compensatory
judgment awarded, judgment affirmed, otherwise new trial ordered as
to exemplary damages only.
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-NEW TRIAL-NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS-Miller vs. The People-No. 13231

-Decided April 3, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Archie Miller was convicted of larceny of a calf. He seeks reversal
of the sentence.
1. Application for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, unless
there has been an abuse of that discretion, an appellate court will not
interfere with the action of the trial court.
2. Newly discovered evidence going only to impeach the credit
or character of a witness is not sufficient ground for a new trial, except
it is clear that such impeachment would have resulted in a different
verdict.
3. The contentions that Miller's arrest and conviction were
brought about by a frameup is devoid of merit.
4. The ground that counsel appointed by the court presented
the case inefficiently at the trial is without merit.
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5. It is not reversible error to fail to give a cautionary instruction on accomplices where there was ample corroboration.
6. The instructions given were fair.
7. The contention that defendant was given a longer term of
imprisonment than the statute permits on the theory that he was only
an accessory after the fact is not tenable as the evidence showed that
the defendant was a principal and was punishable as such.-Judgment
afflrmed.-Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.
DEEDS - REFORMATION - PRORATION OF MORTGAGE LIABILITY
WHERE SEPARATE PARCELS COVERED BY MORTGAGE ARE CON-

VEYED-Hooper vs. The Capitol Life Insurance Co.-No. 12700
-Decided April 3, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Hooper owned five lots upon which there were two apartment
buildings subject to $14,000 mortgage to Capitol Life Insurance Company. Thereafter Hooper conveyed to James one of the apartment
buildings in exchange for a farm. The deed covenanted that the property was free from encumbrance except the $14,000 mortgage, which
the grantee assumed. James thereafter borrowed from Gallup and gave
a trust deed on the apartment building that he had purchased. The
insurance company sued to foreclose the Hooper mortgage. James sought
reformation of the deed by cross complaint on the ground that the
assumption clause was placed in the deed without his knowledge and
contrary to the agreement of the parties. It appeared that the apartment
building was worth $15,000 and that the farm received in exchange
was worth $40,000 subject to $11,000 encumbrance, and that
the value of the other apartment building, retained by Hooper, was
$25,000. The court below reformed the deed and decreed that as between Hooper and James, the property deeded to James should bear
three-eighths and the property retained by Hooper would bear fiveeighths of the total mortgage debt.
1. To justify the reformation of the deed, the proof must be
clear, unequivocal and indubitable; a mere preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient.
2. In this case, if it was true, as Hooper contends it is, that James
assumed and agreed to pay the entire encumbrance on both the properties that James acquired and the property retained by Hooper, namely,
a total of $14,000, he would be receiving for his $29,000 equity in
the farm only $1,000, which would mean a clear loss of $28,000. It
is highly improbable that anyone in his right mind would make such
an agreement. In view of this and other evidence, it is clear that the
written agreement for exchange of properties expressed the real intent
of the parties and that the assumption of mortgage clause was inserted
in the deed without the consent or knowledge of James.
3. The fact that a person accepts or signs an instrument without reading the same is not of itself a conclusive barrier to a suit for
reformation. A grantee is not conclusively bound by an assumption
clause in a deed. He may show the real contract between the parties,
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though in contradiction of the assumption clause, and parol evidence
is admissible therefor.
4. Where an estate, subject to a mortgage, is conveyed by the
mortgagor in parcels at different times, and the mortgage debt is not
mentioned in a deed, such debt should be satisfied, first, out of that
portion of the estate retained by the mortgagor and then out of the
parcels aliened, in the inverse order of alienation.-Judgment affirmed.
TAXATION-DISTRAINT WARRANTS-DUTY OF SHERIFF TO SERVE

--J. W. Goldsmith vs. A. M. McAnally-No. 12915-Decided
April 3, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
County Treasurer sought by mandamus to compel county sheriff
to serve a distraint warrant for the purpose of collecting delinquent
personal property taxes. The lower court held that sheriff was under
no legal duty to serve a distraint warrant and sustained the demurrer
and entered judgment of dismissal.
1. Under the statutes of Colorado, the sheriff is required to serve
all process, writs and orders, issued or made by lawful authority.
2. Under the statutes of Colorado, the county treasurer is authorized to issue distraint warrant for collection of personal taxes, and
it is the duty of the sheriff to serve the distraint warrant.
3. A treasurer's distraint warrant is analogous to an execution.
4. A distraint warrant is a non-judicial process, precept or order,
made by lawful authority, and it is the duty of the sheriff to serve
and execute the same.-Judgment reversed.
CONSPIRACY - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - DEMONSTRATION IN
COURTROOM
EXCESSIVE VERDICT--Clark et al. vs. Machette-

No. 12466-Decided April 3, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Campbell.
Plaintiff below recovered judgment for $2,500 against defendants
on eight different causes of action, in substance charging conspiracy to
injure plaintiff by unlawful searches, unlawful removal of her property, unlawful arrest, and unfounded chazges of insanity.
1. Neither the 3-year nor the 1-year statute of limitations applied in this conspiracy case, although charged in eight different counts,
some of which was charged as occuring at the beginning of 1932, the
complaint stated in reality but one cause of action, namely, an executed
conspiracy which resulted in injury to the plaintiff.
2. Where the court rebukes spectators at a trial for demonstration, but the record does not disclose just what the demonstration was
and the defendants, at the time, make no suggestion to the court as to
the possibility of the remarks having a prejudicial effect on the defendants, there was no error.
3. The verdict for $2,500 under the evidence was not excessive.
4. Judgment should be set aside as to defendant, Sam Goldhammer, as the evidence discloses he had no part in the conspiracy.Judgment affirmed in part and set aside in part.
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FIRE INSURANCE-LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY-LOSS-LESSEE
ENTITLED TO INSURANCE-Dolan vs. Spencer-No. 13286Decided April 3, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Spencer owned land with improvements subject to $7,000 mortgage. Spencer leased the property to Dolan for three years with option
to purchase, providing that if Dolan paid taxes and interest on the
mortgage and by November 1, 1932, paid $1,000 and interest, he
was to have a warranty deed subject to the mortgage. The improvements were worth $11,000 and were insured for $7,000. While contract was in effect, improvements were destroyed by fire, and Dolan
demanded rebuilding, which was not done, and Spencer collected the
insurance. Dolan brought action against Spencer to recover for the loss.
Demurrer to complaint sustained, and judgment entered for Spencer.
1. The general rule is that under the facts above that the insurance stands in lieu of the burned property and that the insurance money
goes to the purchaser.-Judgmentreversed.
VERDICT CONSISTENCY - BILL OF PARTICULARS - The Rocky
Mountain Fuel Co. vs. Betk-No. 12621-Decided April 10,
1933---Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Belk brought suit to recover $5,615.73 for services as detective.
Belk filed bill of particulars on order of court. Cause tried to a jury.
Jury found for Belk for $3,600. The evidence was sufficient to support a verdict either for the entire amount or for the sum admitted
and tendered by the defendant, but no possible view of the evidence can.
reconcile the evidence with the verdict for the sum of $3,600.
1. A verdict must be consistent with some legitimate theory of
the testimony, and where it is not, it should be set aside.
2. Neither the court nor the jury has any right to find for the

plaintiff in contradiction of his bill of particulars.--Judgmentreversed.
WATERS-CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION-The San Luis Valley

Irrigation District et al. vs. Knowlton-No. 12673-Decided
April 10, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Knowlton brought action to change the point of diversion of his
irrigating ditch. The court below found that no substantial injurious
effect to the vested right of other water users in the district would
result from the change in point of diversion petitioned for and granted
the petition.

1. Where the vested rights of other water users in a district will
not be injured by the change of point of diversion of an irrigating ditch,
it is proper to change the point of diversion.
2. The fact that the court below found that no substantial injurious effect to the vested rights of other water users would result from
such change cannot be urged on appeal where the court in another
part of its findings and decree declared that the changes asked for will
not injuriously affect the vested rights of other appropriators.-Judgment affirmed.
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COMMON LAW TRUST-CONSTRUCTION-COMMISSIONS

TO TRUS-

TEES-Todd us. Ford et at. and Wright, as Administrator, us.
Ford et al.-Nos. 12407 and 12408-Decided April 10, 1933Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Certain certificate holders of a common law trust recovered judgment below against the trustees of the common law trust for an accounting. Accounting had and judgments in severalty were given
against defendants below.
1. A declaration of trust, which is mentioned in certificates
issued to certificate holders is binding upon the certificate holders or
unit holders.
2. Where no fraud or overreaching is shown the rights and
liabilities of all the parties to the trust, including unit holders and trustees alike, must rest on the provisions of the declaration of trust.
3. Where the declaration of trust provides that trustees actively
engaged in administering the trust shall be reasonably compensated, they
are entitled to charge reasonable commissions for the sale of certificates
or units in the trust.--Judgment reversed.
REPLEVIN--STOCK

CERTIFICATES-JOINDER

OF

OFFICER

WITH

CORPORATON-Blackmer and The D. F. Blackmer Furniture &
Carpet Co. vs. Blackmer-No. 12929-Decided April 10, 1933
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Mrs. Blackmer recovered judgment in replevin against the corporation and its president for certain certificates of capital stock.
1. Where the evidence concerning the ownership of certificates of
stock is conflicting, the weight and credibility thereof is for the lower
court to determine.
2.
There is no inconsistency in joining both a corporation and
its president as defendants in a replevin action as they both may be
wrongfully withholding certificates of stock in their joint possession
and the evidence that such possession was so held by both the defendants was clearly established.
By pleading over, any erroneous rulings on motions or de3.
murrer, except as they relate to the objection of insufficiency of the
facts to constitute a cause of action, are waived.-Judgment affirmed.
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE-Blackmer vs. Blackmer-No. 13107Decided April 10, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Blackmer brought a suit for divorce in the court below. Answer
and cross complaint, praying for separate maintenance by defendant;
jury found for defendant on cross complaint, and judgment entered
thereon.
1. Where the evidence is conflicting and the record fails to show
that the presiding judge misconceived or misapplied the law, no prejudicial error is apparent. The judgment will be affirmed.--Judgment
affirmed.
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-CLAIM FOR SERVICES TO DECEDENT-VALIDITY-Mitchell Vs. Sheets-No. 12858-Decided

April 17, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
Clara Sheets, granddaughter of decedent, recovered a judgment
against the estate in the County Court based upon a claim for services rendered as housekeeper and nurse for nine years prior to his death.
On appeal to the District Court, claim was allowed, and writ of error
prosecuted.
Decedent was aged, and at his request. his granddaughter came
from another state and acted as housekeeper and nurse for a period of
nearly nine years, upon a verbal agreement that if she would take care
of him, he would bear all her expenses and pay her well.
1. A defense to such a claim that the claimant was a member
of the family, and her services were rendered gratuitously, is an insufficient defense on the face of an express agreement for reimbursement
for services.-Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY-EFFECT OF PLEA-ngles vs. The People-No. 13135-DecidedApril 17 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Ingles was charged with murder, pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death, and on writ
of error, judgment was reversed, and on new trial, defendant pleaded
not guilty and was again convicted of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to death. At the second trial, defendant sought to introduce
evidence tending to show that at the time of the homicide, he was insane. The court sustained the state's objection holding that under the
Act of 1927 concerning pleas of insanity in criminal cases, such evidence was not admissible, the defendant having withdrawn his former
plea of not guilty on the ground of insanity and substituted the general
plea of not guilty.
1. A statute providing that insanity shall not be a defense to a
criminal charge would be unconstitutional.
2. The purpose of the Act of 1927, Chapter 90, is to require
the defense of insanity to be tried only under a special plea. This defense cannot be introduced under the plea of not guilty.
3.
However, evidence of defendant's mental condition at the time
of the homicide is admissible under a plea of not guilty for the purpose
of reducing the grade of the crime from murder in the first degree to
murder in the second degree, and for the further reason that the jury,
having a discretion in first degree murder affixing the penalty of death
or imprisonment for life, such evidence is competent to go to the jury
in determining which penalty the jury shall inflict.
4. Where the state introduces evidence of a confession, such evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing all the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession.-Mr. Justice Bouck specially
concurs.-Judgment reversed.
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TAXATON-SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF ENTIRE TAX PAID-EXCESSIVE

TAXATON-Miller et at. vs. Board of County Commissioners et al.
-No.
12755-Decided April 17, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Plaintiffs below brought this action under Section 7447 Compiled
Laws, 1921, to recover certain taxes paid under protest on the ground
that the taxes were illegal in assessment and levy and deprived the taxing authorities of jurisdiction. Judgment for defendants below.
1. Where the assessor increased valuation of property without
notice and without hearing, taxpayers' relief is confined to the tax
based upon the valuation "which the assessor added to the schedule."
2. But if a taxpayer is so deprived by his own neglect, he can
claim nothing.
3. There are two prerequisites to a suit under Section 7447
supra, that is, that the tax be paid and that it be erroneous or illegal.
4. Here the tax was neither erroneous nor illegal; if incorrect for
any reason, it was simply that it was excessive.
5. There is neither pleading nor proof in the instant suit that the
tax is either erroneous or illegal.
6. A taxpayer who seeks relief against an alleged overassessment
may have it only by affirmatively and clearly showing that it is manifestly excessive, fraudulent or oppressive.
7. Where a taxpayer expressly repudiates any claim to a refund
of the excessive tax and makes no demand save for a repayment of
the entire amount, and where it appears that the tax is neither erroneous
nor illegal, they are not entitled to relief.--Judgment affirmed.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL

CONTRACT-EASEMENT-French

vs.

Mitchell-No. 13284-Decided April 17, 1933-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouck.
Mitchell instituted suit against French to enforce specific performance of a contract for an easement for a right of way over lands. The
contract was oral. Mitchell claims it was taken out of the statute of
frauds by part performance. Judgment below for defendants.
1. The right of a party who has done acts in part execution of a
verbal contract for an easement or right of way over land to call upon
a court of equity to enforce it is subject to the restriction that his
position is such that an action at law for damages will not afford adequate relief.
2. The acts relied upon must appear to have been done in pursuance of the verbal contract alleged.
3. It must be such an act done, as appears to the court would
not have been done, unless, on account of the agreement.
4. Where one seeks to enforce a verbal agreement for a right of
way across lands and it appears that it was not a way of necessity,
there being other means of ingress and egress, and it further appearing
that the only part performance of such verbal contract consisted of
the plaintiff building a line fence at a trivial expense, is not sufficient to
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take case out of the statute of frauds, and particularly is this true where
the buliding of such fence was primarily and originally, intended for
the natural protection and adornment of the plaintiffs' property.
5. Ifi order to take a verbal contract for an easement out of the
statute of frauds, the relation of the parties must be such that the loss
of improvements resulting from a failure to complete the agreement
would be an actual sacrifice on the part of the party seeking to enforce it.
6. Where a complaint is grounded on a specific performance of a
verbal agreement for an easement and the trial court adopts tfiat theory,
it cannot be asserted that the action is an injunction suit in the appellate
court..--Judgment reversed.
ATTORNEYS-LIEN FOR SERVICES-PRIORITY BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY'S LIEN AND GARNISHMENT-EXTENT OF LIEN--Col-

lins vs. Thuringer-No. 12815-Decided April 20, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
First in point of time, W. R. Cline obtained judgment in the district court against Edith Thuringer. Later, the same court rendered
judgment in favor of Edith Thuringer and against Charles W. Thuringer. W. Penn Collins acted as Edith Thuringer's attorney in the
latter case. The day after rendition of the latter judgment, Cline took
out execution and caused garnishment summons to be served on Charles
W. Thuringer, who answered that he was indebted to Edith Thuringer
on the prior judgment and the court rendered judgment against garnishee; and subsequent to judgment against garnishee, Collins filed statement claiming attorney's lien not, only for services in the latter case,
but including services in other matters. The court below decreed garnishment judgment of Cline senior to the attorney's lien of Collins.
1. An attorney who obtains a judgment for his client has a
lien on the judgment for his fee in obtaining the same.
2. As between attorney and client, such lien is valid without
notice.
3. If a judgment debtor, without notice that the attorney intends to enforce his lien, should make a bona fide settlement of the
judgment, or if an innocent third person, without such notice, should
purchase the judgment or acquire an interest therein, the attorney's
lien would be lost.
4. When the garnishment summons was served in the instant
case, such judgment was inferior to the attorney's lien.
5. A garnishment proceeding cannot displace prior valid and
bona fide existing rights and claims against the debt or property involved.
6. An attorney's lien under Section 6010 and 6011, Compiled
Laws of 1921, is limited to a lien upon the judgment to secure the
payment of attorney's fees earned in matters concerning the judgment
and not for services rendered on other matters disconnected therewith.Judgment reversed.
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PLEADING-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-CHATTEL MORTGAGE-

LEASE-The D. F. Blackmer Furniture Company vs. BingharNo. 13288-Decided April 24, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
1. In consideration of a landlord's forbearance to assert his rent
lien on the furniture of a tenant, the furniture company warranted to
the landlord that it held a valid chattel mortgage which constituted a
prior lien on the furniture, and that if such warranty proved false it
would pay the landlord's claim. In an action against the company on
such warranty a complaint was defective which did not allege all the
facts necessary to show that such chattel mortgage was not a valid
prior lien at the time of the warranty.
2. Where the lease was originally made by a lessor other than
the plaintiff, the complaint must allege how plaintiff acquired an interest therein so as to show that plaintiff had a right which he gave up
in consideration of defendant's warranty.--Judgment reversed with
directions.

CORPORATIONS-RECEIVER-REMOVAL

OF-ESTOPPEL-LACHES-

FRAUD-Thompson et af. vs. Beck-No. 12713-Decided April
24, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Participation and acquiescence by stockholders in plans for
reorganization of a corporation in receivership estops them from later
objecting to the actions of the receiver in carrying out such plans.
2. Rule XVIII of the Supreme Court affords a ready method
of review of action taken to secure the receiver's discharge. Stockholders, who for years had opportunity to resort to such method, are guilty
of laches for failure to do so.
3.
Fraud must be pleaded with definiteness and certainty, and
proved as pleaded. Inferences and conclusions of the pleader cannot
be substituted for allegations of fact.
4. Where the appointment of a receiver was intended to afford
a speedy determination of the corporate affairs, continuance of the receivership for eight years disapproved.-Judgment affirmed.
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BAR ASSOCIATION

The secretary of the Bar Association was very busy and
rather cross. The telephone rang.
"Well, what is it?" he snapped.
"Is this the city gas works?" said a woman's soft voice.
"No, madam," roared the secretary, "this is the San
Francisco Bar Association."
"Ah," she answered in the sweetest of tones, "I didn't
miss it so far, after all, did I?"
Charles Mathews, who in his younger days knew what it
was to be very much worried with debts, once met a friend
who asked him if he could spare him 10s. to help bury a
bailiff. "Certainly," replied Mathews, "here's a sovereign,
bury two."
DUELLING

A southern Missouri man recently was tried on a charge
of assault. The State brought into court, as the weapons
used, a rail, an axe, a pair of tongs, a saw, and a rifle. The
defendant's counsel exhibited, as the other man's weapons, a
scythe blade, a pitchfork, a pistol, and a hoe. The jury's
verdict is said to have been: "Resolved, That we, the jury,
would have given a dollar to have seen the fight."
EVIDENCE

"You look sweet enough to kiss," says the impressed
man.

"So many gentlemen tell me that," coyly answers the
fair girl.
"Ah! That should make you happy."
"But they merely say that," she replies. "They merely
tell me the facts in the case and never prove their statements."
Lawyer: "How do you know that this man was given
to talking to himself when he was alone?"
Witness: "Shure, haven't Oi been wid him time and time
again when he did it?"
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